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Fame, Property, and Identity: The Scope
and Purpose of the Right of Publicity
Daniel Gervais* & Martin L. Holmes†
[I]n addition to and independent of that right of
privacy . . . a man has a right in the publicity value
of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such
a grant may validly be made ‘in gross,’ i.e., without
an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else. Whether it be labelled a ‘property’ right
is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag
‘property’ simply symbolizes the fact that courts
enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth. This
right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’1
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INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is not a trademark right. While the right
of publicity often overlaps with rights granted by trademark law
and other deception-based restrictions on the use of names and
symbols,2 the right of publicity creates a more expansive right
rooted in a variegated normative soil with elements of privacy, personhood, and property.3 This has a number of significant impacts.
First, while consumer welfare is a key rationale for trademark law,
it is an after-the-fact justification—not a compelling motivation—
for the right of publicity. Second, an incentive to produce the object of the law’s protection—a musical composition protected by
copyright, a new molecule protected by a pharmaceutical patent, or
a quality brand protected by a trademark—can be offered as a rationale for the existence of most intellectual property rights. But is
incentivizing the creation of a public persona or notoriety really the
goal of the right of publicity? We think not.
2

See 28 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:8 (4th
ed. 2014).
3
See id.
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The different rationales behind the right of publicity and
trademark law matter. A trademark owner alleging trademark infringement must prove not that his rights in a particular trademark
are affected—as would be the case in a copyright or patent context—but rather that the defendant’s use of a similar trademark is
likely to cause confusion among relevant, reasonably prudent potential purchasers of the product or service related to the trademark.4 The right of publicity gives an individual something akin
more to a property right in his name or likeness. It allows individuals to assert a right in their identity. It allows famous individuals to
monetize their identity. As the Article explains, fame need not be
lasting or even acquired deliberately to trigger the publicity right.
The right of publicity is in its infancy, and the right will be
tested with new and evolving uses of individuals’ names and likenesses. Online uses, and use of celebrities in posts in social media
are likely to escalate attempts to use the right to bar or restrict online speech. Particularly relevant to the development of the right of
publicity is the impact that the digital age has on both a celebrity’s
desire to maintain privacy and, conversely, opportunities for celebrities to monetize their likeness (and fame)—from Facebook pages and likes, to Tweets, and many other forms not yet in commercial use, such as projections of three-dimensional celebrity holograms.5 Because of shaky theoretical underpinnings, “judges . . .
expand the content of persona [to avoid] creating arbitrary distinctions” between who may assert the right of publicity.6 This paper
seeks to solidify those theoretical underpinnings.
The evolution of the right should be guided towards a right that
neither overprotects nor underprotects the commercial use of
one’s name or likeness. This crucial balancing act is arguably the
target in all areas of intellectual property law. However, the object
of protection in the right of publicity—a person’s name and like4

See id. § 28:12.
See Evelyn M. Rusli, New Chip to Bring Holograms to Smartphones: Ostendo’s Tiny
Projectors Are Designed to Display Crisp Video, Glasses-Free 3-D Images, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, June 2, 2014, http://on.wsj.com/1zR0jyY.
6
George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51 LA. L.
REV. 443, 466 (1991).
5
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ness—seems the most “personal” of all forms of intellectual property law,7 leading to an intuitive notion that the right of publicity
should grant powerful protections to individuals. Conversely, celebrities are also objects of social discourse. They fascinate us. Paparazzi hunt them for pictures taken while in public places but also in
intimate settings.8 We must be allowed to speak about them, but up
to what point?9
Protection granted by the right of privacy disposes of a number
of arguments that the right of publicity is the sole protector of certain dignitary interests in one’s name and likeness. The expectation
of privacy does not disappear just because someone is famous—
though it may limit the scope of the reasonable expectation. Fame
creates a distinct object of protection: the ability to use and monetize one’s likeness.10 When the likeness is directly associated with
the sale or promotion of a commercial product or service, the law is
fairly straightforward. Unfair competition law and other deceptionbased restrictions, such as the Lanham Act and false endorsement
7

This Article assumes, but does not argue or endorse, that the right of publicity is a
form of protection of intangible property that broadly fits under the banner of intellectual
property law.
8
See Richard J. Curry, Jr. Diana’s Law, Celebrity And The Paparazzi: The Continuing
Search For A Solution, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 945, 946 (2000)
(“Celebrities and the media possess a unique relationship. Many celebrities skillfully use
the media to market and advertise their movies, television shows, books, and records.
They use the media to propel their careers and create a marketable celebrity image.
Society is celebrity crazed and magazines, tabloids and other media forms such as
Entertainment Tonight and Access Hollywood have combined to feed that craze. Our
society’s hunger for celebrities has spawned the existence of photographers known as the
paparazzi. Armed with zoom lenses, high-powered microphones, and the promise of huge
cash rewards for an exclusive celebrity exposé, the paparazzi have become more intrusive
and aggressive than ever in their pursuit of private celebrity information.”).
9
See Stacey Dogan, Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum: Publicity as a Legal
Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE 17, 37 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane
C. Ginsburg eds., 2014) (“Because the right of publicity has no coherent normative
objective, the process of balancing celebrity rights against speech interests can appear
rudderless and ad hoc.”).
10
In fact, one of the main arguments to justify an inquiry into the right of publicity was
its direct impact on the value of the estates of famous people. See Larry Moore, Regulating
Publicity: Does Elvis Want Privacy?, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (1995)
(“Thus, the debate concerning the nature of publicity is more than an academic argument
among legal scholars. The manner in which this issue is resolved can, and will, have great
economic impact on celebrities as well as their estates.”).
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laws, protect against the use of one’s identity in a false, deceptive,
or confusing way. In such cases, the goal is to protect members of
the public against the deception of purchasing a good or service
they believe to be endorsed by a celebrity.11 The domain that remains for the right of publicity to protect exclusively is revealing: the
right of publicity alone protects the commercial use of nondeceptive, non-private references to an individual. The questions
that emerge are: who benefits from this and why?
The thesis of this Article is that the right of publicity exists to
protect rights in an individual’s identity, not for the benefit of consumers. Those rights should die with the individual (or very shortly
thereafter), extend only to the name and likeness of the individual,
and must succumb to the First Amendment in certain contexts.
First, this Article examines the genesis of the right of publicity and
the manner in which certain courts have defined the boundaries of
the right and how it differs from the right to privacy. Then, the Article turns to arguments for and against the right of publicity. Most
importantly, it discusses the overlap between the right of publicity
and trademark law and explicates the key normative differences
between the two types of right. Next, the Article discusses the dangers of overprotection and underprotection in the context of the
right of publicity, along with First Amendment limitations. Finally,
the Article argues that the current breadth of the right of publicity is
not supported by compelling motivations, and suggests limiting the
scope of actionable identity to certain enumerated natural characteristics.

11

See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (The “evidence was
sufficient to support the jury’s finding that consumers were likely to be misled by the
commercial into believing that Waits endorsed SalsaRio Doritos.”); see also Allen v.
Men’s World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. 360, 368–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (likelihood of consumer
confusion established where advertiser intentionally used a look-alike of well-known
celebrity and where audience to whom commercial was directed intersected with
celebrity’s audience).
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I. THE ROOTS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. The Genesis of the Right of Publicity
“The principal historical antecedent of the right of publicity is
the right of privacy.”12 Warren and Brandeis first introduced the
right of privacy in a law review article13 in 1890 as a theory “focusing upon the affront to human dignity caused by public disclosure
of embarrassing private facts.”14 Over the next seventy years, the
right of privacy came to encompass four torts, as laid out by William Prosser: “unreasonable intrusions upon another’s seclusion,
public disclosure of private facts, publicity placing another in a
false light, and the appropriation for the defendant’s advantage of
the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”15 The modern day right of publicity grew out of Prosser’s appropriation tort.16
It was not clear at first whether the right to privacy would include a cause of action for the commercial misappropriation of a
person’s name or likeness. In 1902, the New York Appellate Division, in Roberson, refused to extend the right of privacy to recognize
injury for emotional distress resulting from the unauthorized use of
a previously nonfamous plaintiff’s photograph in an advertisement.17 However, in 1905, the Supreme Court of Georgia did find
nearly identical conduct actionable in Pavesich,18 based largely on
the theories of “the right to be let alone” advanced in the Warren
and Brandeis article.19

12

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995).
See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
14
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:25 (2d ed. 2014).
15
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). See William Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
16
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 1:25.
17
See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902)
(milling company made unauthorized use of plaintiff’s likeness in advertisement along
with the words “flour of the family”).
18
See Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68, 79–80 (Ga. 1905)
(holding that defendant insurance company made unauthorized use of plaintiff’s likeness
in an advertisement).
19
Id. at 78; see Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 193.
13
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The public outrage from the Roberson decision led to the
enactment of a statute in New York imposing criminal and civil penalties for the unauthorized use of a person’s name, portrait, or
picture.20 But the Roberson decision hinted at problems to come
with using the right of privacy as a cause of action for the commercial misappropriation of one’s identity; the injury in privacy is to
“mental distress,” not to the commercial interests of an individual.
As Professors Westfall and Landau noted in 2005:
[P]ublicity rights may have stemmed from privacy
rights, but they are clearly also independent of those
rights—the right question to ask is not simply which
aspects of plaintiff’s identity are most personal, but
rather which aspects have value to an advertiser
based on appropriating the celebrity’s image. Publicity rights, according to most courts and commentators, seem to be based at least as much on pecuniary value as on human dignity concerns.21
The publicity right reifies fame; it allows famous persons to
commoditize the value of their public persona, or in other words to
transform their persona into a market-based, tradable commodity.22
While some judges have pinned the right not to this economic
realm but rather to the apparent distress caused by the unauthorized use of a famous person’s likeness, most courts have been unable, to see how a celebrity—someone who has intentionally placed
himself in the public realm23—could suffer from “mental dis20

Prosser, supra note 15, at 385 (asserting that the majority opinion in Roberson created
“a storm of public disapproval . . . . In consequence the next New York legislature
enacted a statute making it both a misdemeanor and a tort to make use of the name,
portrait, or picture of any person for ‘advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade’
without his written consent”).
21
David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights As Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 94 n.115 (2005).
22
See Margaret Jane Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in NOMOS XXXI, MARKETS
AND JUSTICE 167 (1989) (“Universal commodification implies that all things can and
should be separable from persons and exchanged through the free market.”).
23
In Japan, mental distress is generally not recognized as a form of damage for
celebrities because they have voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye. See Tōkyō
Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] June 29, 1976 817 HANJI 23 (Japan.) For an English
translation, see Doi, Character Merchandising in Japan: Protection of Fictional Characters
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tress”24 due to a nondeceptive, nonprivate commercial use of their
name or likeness.25 This distinction is partly what led Judge Jerome
Frank to create a new label—“the right of publicity”26—a cause of
action that recognized a person’s entitlement to profits resulting
from the commercial use of that person’s name or likeness.27 Other
states followed the lead of New York and Judge Frank, recognizing
a similar right in the common law or statutorily. Today, at least
thirty-one states recognize the right of publicity in some form.28
and Well-Known Personalities as the Basis for Merchandising Activities, ANNUAL OF INDUS.
PROP. LAW 283 (1978).
24
See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959–60
(1982) (“One may gauge the strength or significance of someone’s relationship with an
object by the kind of pain that would be occasioned by its loss. On this view, an object is
closely related to one’s personhood if its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the
object’s replacement. If so, that particular object is bound up with the holder . . . . The
opposite of holding an object that has become a part of oneself is holding an object that is
perfectly replaceable with other goods of equal market value. One holds such an object for
purely instrumental reasons.”).
25
O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) (rejecting plaintiff’s
“complaint . . . that he was damaged by the invasion of his privacy in so using his picture
as to create the impression that he was endorsing beer”). See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14,
§ 1:25 (“[W]hen a plaintiff whose identity was already well known sued under [the right
of privacy appropriation tort] approach, the courts could not see how there could be
‘indignity’ or ‘mental distress’ when plaintiff’s identity was already in widespread use in
the media.”). But see Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The
defendants argue that in right of publicity actions, only damages to compensate for
economic injury are available. We disagree. Although the injury stemming from violation
of the right of publicity ‘may be largely, or even wholly, of an economic or material
nature,’ we have recognized that ‘it is quite possible that the appropriation of the identity
of a celebrity may induce humiliation, embarrassment, and mental distress.’”).
26
Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(“For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ballplayers), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines,
busses, trains and subways”); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 1:26 (“Judge Jerome Frank
in 1953 was the first to coin the term ‘right of publicity.’”).
27
A number of commentators have noted that the economic harm rationale for the
right of publicity is circular. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 2:2 (arguing that it is
circular reasoning to base legal protection upon economic value when economic value
depends upon legal protection (citing Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935))).
28
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 6:3 (“At the time of this writing, courts have
expressly recognized the right of publicity as existing under the common law of 21 states.
Of those, eight also have statutory provisions broad enough to encompass the right of

2014]

FAME, PROPERTY, AND IDENTITY

189

B. The Overbreadth of the Right of Publicity
One case that claimed a violation of privacy, the Lanham Act,
and the right of publicity came in 1983 when the Sixth Circuit
found that the defendant’s “Here’s Johnny” portable toilet violated Johnny Carson’s right of publicity.29 The phrase “Here’s
Johnny” was used to introduce Johnny Carson each night on his
wildly successful late night variety show.30 The business name
“Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets” was used in conjunction with
the catchphrase “The World’s Foremost Commodian.”31 The
court found that the portable toilet company did not create a likelihood of confusion that consumers would think Johnny Carson
was affiliated with the company.32 Interestingly, the court also held
that Johnny Carson’s right of privacy had not been infringed.33
However, the court did find an infringement of the right of publicity,34 noting the many other licensed commercial uses of the phrase
“Here’s Johnny”35 and the corporation’s knowledge of the notoriety of Carson and his show.36 Then, Carson was “harmed” only
because the court recognized the right of publicity in this instance.
The public was not harmed at all. The dissent noted that he did not
believe “the common law right of publicity may be extended
beyond an individual’s name, likeness, achievements, identifying
characteristics or actual performances, to include phrases or other
things which are merely associated with the individual, as is the
phrase ‘Here’s Johnny.’”37

publicity. In addition, ten states have statutes which, while some are labeled ‘privacy’
statutes, are worded in such a way that most aspects of the right of publicity are embodied
in those statutes. Thus, at the time of this writing, under either statute or common law,
the right of publicity is recognized as the law of 31 states.”).
29
See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir.
1983).
30
Id. at 832.
31
Id. at 833.
32
See id. at 834.
33
See id.
34
See id. at 836.
35
See id. at 833.
36
See id.
37
Id. at 837 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
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White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. is a case finding an
infringement of the right of publicity in extreme circumstances.38
In White, an “advertisement . . . for Samsung video-cassette recorders (VCRs) . . . depicted a robot, dressed in a wig, gown, and
jewelry which [defendants] consciously selected to resemble [Vanna] White’s hair and dress.”39 “The robot was posed next to a
game board which is instantly recognizable as the Wheel of Fortune
game show set, in a stance for which White is famous.”40 This advertisement was one in a series of advertisements making future
predictions, and accordingly, the ad included the caption “Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D.”41 “The gag here . . . was that
Samsung would still be around when White had been replaced by a
robot.”42
Dissenting from an order rejecting the suggestion for rehearing
en banc in White, Judge Kozinski said:
The panel’s opinion is a classic case of overprotection. Concerned about what it sees as a wrong done
to Vanna White, the panel majority erects a property right of remarkable and dangerous breadth: Under the majority’s opinion, it’s now a tort for advertisers to remind the public of a celebrity. Not to use a
celebrity’s name, voice, signature or likeness; not to
imply the celebrity endorses a product; but simply
to evoke the celebrity’s image in the public’s
mind.43
In Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., the Ninth Circuit once again recognized an expansive right of publicity.44 Tom Waits, a singer known
38

White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
39
Id. at 1396.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) denying petition for
reh’g.
43
Id.
44
Although technically referred to as a “[v]oice misappropriation” claim in the
opinion, the court recognized that “[t]he Midler tort [of voice misappropriation] is a
species of violation of the ‘right of publicity,’ the right of a person whose identity has
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for his raspy voice, maintained a policy throughout his career that
he would not do endorsements because he did not want to detract
from his artistic integrity.45 After an advertising company conceptualized an advertisement based off of a Tom Waits song, the court
concluded the advertising agency felt “that no one would do but a
singer who could . . . imitate Tom Waits’ voice.”46 To that end,
the defendants engaged a performer who had “perfected an imitation of Waits’ voice” to sing in the advertisement.47 In finding that
the advertising agency and Frito-Lay “acted with malice” and violated Waits’ right of publicity, the court focused on the defendants’ knowledge of Waits’ policy against endorsements and legal
concerns that the sound-a-like singer sounded too much like Tom
Waits.48 The apparent harm of Frito-Lay’s use was that Waits realized “immediately that whoever was going to hear this and obviously identify the voice would also identify that [Tom Waits] in
fact had agreed to do a commercial for Doritos.”49
The facts in Waits clearly show a likelihood of confusion as to a
false endorsement from Waits, extended beyond the more typical
visual likeness to include aural confusion. The Court did find a violation of the Lanham Act.50 However, the court vacated damages
awarded under the Lanham Act because those damages were duplicative of damages received for the right of publicity violation.51
Thus, it appears that the right of publicity is not necessary to allow
a celebrity to assert a cause of action against an advertiser who intentionally mimics the voice of the celebrity and causes confusion
commercial value—most often a celebrity—to control the commercial use of that
identity.” Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1974)).
45
See id.
46
Id. at 1097.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 1105.
49
Id. at 1098.
50
See id. at 1111 (“Th[e] evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that
consumers were likely to be misled by the commercial into believing that Waits endorsed
SalsaRio Doritos.”).
51
See id. (“The jury awarded Waits $100,000 on [the Lanham Act] claim. It also
awarded Waits $100,000 for the fair market value of his services on his voice
misappropriation claim. The damages awarded under the Lanham Act, therefore, are
duplicative. Accordingly, we vacate this portion of the judgment.”).
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among consumers as to endorsement or sponsorship.52 Waits is the
aural equivalent to a long line of look-alike cases—where look-alike
actors are hired to stand in place of a celebrity.53 The plaintiffs in
those cases, as in Waits, have a cause of action under false endorsement and other deception-based restrictions.
In Hart, the likeness of Ryan Hart, a former all-star quarterback
for Rutgers, was used by Electronic Arts in their NCAA Football
series of videogames without a license.54 The likenesses of countless other collegiate football players were also used in the same
manner in making the video games.55 As a condition of participation in NCAA athletics, Mr. Hart agreed to not accept “any remuneration or permit[] the use of his . . . name or picture to advertise,
recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial
product or service of any kind.”56 Although Mr. Hart’s name was
not used in the videogame, the players in the game “are populated
by digital avatars that resemble their real-life counterparts and
share their vital and biographical information. . . . [F]or example, in
NCAA Football 2006, Rutgers’ quarterback, player number 13, is
6’2” tall, weighs 197 pounds and resembles Hart.”57
In what reads more like a treatise than a judicial opinion,58 the
Third Circuit adopted the transformative use test—whether the
defendant made significant contributions in the use to make the use
her own expression59—for balancing the right of publicity with the
First Amendment in Hart. Despite the addition of many creative
elements to the videogame, the Court found that the video games
“do not sufficiently transform Appellant’s identity to escape the
52

But see Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
unfair competition claim because “Midler did not do television commercials. The
defendants were not in competition with her.”).
53
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1984) aff’d, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (involving a Jacqueline Onassis
look-alike used in a Dior advertisement).
54
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013).
55
See id. at 168.
56
Id. at 145.
57
Id.
58
The opinion surveys the right of publicity case law and the merits of the different
tests proposed by courts and scholars. See id. at 152–65.
59
Infra, Section IV.A.
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right of publicity claim.”60 The dissent in Hart would have also
applied the transformative use test, but would have reached a different conclusion: “Hart’s ‘likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’
from which [the] original work is synthesized . . . [rather than] the
very sum and substance of the work in question.’”61 Thus, the dissenting judge, applying the transformative use test, would have
found that the First Amendment shielded Electronic Arts from
Hart’s right of publicity claim.
Hart presents a most difficult set of facts. However, wherever
the appropriate line is in balancing the right of publicity with the
First Amendment, Hart is near it.62 In the dissent, Judge Ambro
noted that Hart’s case is a sympathetic one because Hart and other
college football players are huge economic engines that are uncompensated.63
Are White, Hart, Here’s Johnny, and Waits beyond the scope of
a right of publicity that conforms to the First Amendment and the
compelling motivations for the existence of the right? Those cases
ask the right basic factual inquiries, but whether the results are
based on the right balance of interests is the real question. Does
granting Vanna White a monopoly in being a blond co-host or sidekick on Wheel of Fortune benefit the public? Does merely reminding
consumers of Ms. White go far beyond infringing the rights she
might possess in her likeness? Does the public benefit from Johnny
Carson preventing the use of “Here’s Johnny” in an arguably humorous way? Is a phrase like “Here’s Johnny” properly within the
scope of the right of publicity? Why does Tom Waits need to be
able to assert a right of publicity when false endorsement prohibitions achieve the same result?
60

Id. at 170.
Id. at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
62
See generally id.; see also No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397,
400–01 (Cal. 2011) (“[W]e conclude that the creative elements of the Band Hero
videogame do not transform the images of No Doubt’s band members into anything more
than literal, fungible reproductions of their likenesses. Therefore, we reject Activision’s
contention that No Doubt’s right of publicity claim is barred by the First Amendment.”).
63
See Hart, 717 F.3d at 171 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (“The burn to Hart and other
amateur athletes is that, unlike their active professional counterparts, they are not
compensated for EA’s use of their likenesses in its video games.”).
61
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II. THE RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
A. Compelling Motivations for the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity’s historical roots in privacy show the
nexus between the right of publicity and the natural rights many
believe a person has in his name and likeness. “The courts have
uniformly held that the right of publicity is a ‘property’ right.”64
According to some commentators, human identity is a self-evident
property right and the law should protect a person’s identity just as
the law protects any other property right.65 Others say that a human possesses a natural right of “autonomous self-definition.”66
Both of these theories are grounded in “the notion that my identity
is mine—it is my property to control as I see fit.”67 In the words of
John Proctor,68 an individual should be able to control the use of his
name simply “because it is my name!”69 Accordingly, many of
those who believe that the right of publicity is supported by natural
or property rights feel that, in the absence of sufficient countervailing considerations, no other justification for the right of publicity is
necessary.70

64

2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 10:7.
See 1 id. §§ 2:1–2:2 (“Perhaps nothing is so strongly intuited as the notion that my
identity is mine—it is my property to control as I see fit.”).
66
M.P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 225, 285 (2005) (“Since all individuals share the interest in autonomous selfdefinition, every individual should be able to control uses of her identity that interfere
with her ability to define her own public character . . . . [E]ven uses that do not suggest
endorsement may disrupt the message an individual seeks to portray by competing with
meaning the individual has tried to project.”); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 2:9.
67
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, §§ 2:1–2:2.
68
The authors expressly disclaim any endorsement, sponsorship, affiliation,
relationship, reminder, association, or any other authorization—implied or otherwise—
from Arthur Miller, Arthur Miller’s Estate, Daniel Day–Lewis, or John Proctor.
69
ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE 143 (1976).
70
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 2:1 (“Those who are critical of [the natural rights
of property justification for the right of publicity] should have the burden to articulate
some important countervailing social policy which negates this natural impulse of
justice.”); id. § 2:3 (“The advocate of a right of publicity, when called upon to explain
why such a right should exist at all, is not being illogical in simply challenging: ‘Why
not?’”).
65
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“In brief, [an individual] in his lifetime ha[s] a right to create in
his name and/or likeness ‘ . . . a right of value,’ which could have
been transmuted into things of value or [the individual] could, if he
elected not to exercise such right, protect it from invasion by others
by a suit for injunction and/or damages.”71 Then, the right of publicity recognizes the fact that some individuals live a life of solitude
and others a life of publicity. This difference is particularly valuable
in the situation of unauthorized use of an accurate picture or depiction of a nonfamous (or previously nonfamous) individual in advertisement, as occurred in Pavesich and Roberson. It should be noted
that, in this situation, the right of publicity grants individuals a
right that is perhaps subtly different from privacy; it allows individuals to stay out of the public eye by prohibiting truthful, nondeceptive speech about an individual just outside of the right of privacy. The right of publicity protects also against unwanted fame.72
The normative confusion about the right of publicity is precisely
that it performs what may be considered two different functions. In
the case of unwanted “fame,” it provides a remedy for an individual who did not want the fame to begin with. Here, the right is an
extension of its historical anchor, the right of privacy, that is, the
right to be let alone. When fame is wanted, then the right of publicity becomes an entirely new right: a right to manage fame.
There are other compelling motivations advanced to support
the right of publicity. Economists may argue that the right of publicity grants the most efficient user of an individual’s name and
likeness the right to its use.73 Significantly, the right of publicity
facilitates the licensing of an individual’s name and likeness74—a
71

Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979).
It bears emphasis, however, that unwanted is not the same as unplanned but
accepted after the fact, such as for those who perform heroic actions or otherwise gain
substantial media attention.
73
See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of
International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 414 (1983) (“In a
market economy, granting individuals exclusive rights to property is an effective way of
allocating scarce resources.”).
74
See Joseph R. Grodin, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J.
1123, 1126–27 (1953) (“This new right of publicity allows a licensee of a famous person
adequate protection against third parties. Traditionally, direct action by the licensee
against such parties was permitted where they had induced breach of the contract. And, in
72
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process that may otherwise involve a more complex transaction
and a less complete transfer of rights.75 It also prevents the overuse
of an individual’s name and likeness.76
The right of publicity may also protect individuals and the public from certain deceptive or false commercial uses of an individual’s name and likeness in addition to false endorsement laws, the
Lanham Act, and other related laws.77 Similarly, the right of publicity provides an independent cause of action for commercial uses of
a person’s name and likeness that may also violate privacy law by
way of damage to the individual’s dignitary interests. However,
prohibiting uses that are protected by the right of privacy and deception-based restrictions should not be used independently to justify the right of publicity. Although overlapping laws are a necessary evil, planned redundancy is not desirable.
B. Arguments Against a (Broad) Right of Publicity
Professor Michael Madow, who taught for many years at
Brooklyn Law School, presented a compelling case against the right
of publicity.78 He advanced four main arguments. First, Madow
addition, use of a name or picture could be enjoined where continued use constituted
trademark infringement. Otherwise the licensee’s remedy had to be against his licensor.
And in all cases damages—presumably based on lost profits—would be difficult to
prove.”).
75
For example, in Germany the commercial use of one’s name or likeness involves a
covenant not to sue and an incomplete transfer of rights to the licensee. See Daniel Biene,
Celebrity, Culture, Individuality and Right of Publicity as a European Legal Issue, 36 IIC 505,
518 (2005) (“[A]ny right related to personality is under German law strictly inalienable
and not transferable . . . [licensing] is generally done by means of an agreement not to sue,
since the right itself cannot be transferred to third parties.”).
76
Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 97, 110-126 (1994) (The right of publicity helps to prevent rent dissipation).
77
Because a false use of an individual’s name and likeness necessarily means the
plaintiff is identifiable, the right of publicity may be asserted if the plaintiff’s name or
likeness is used in a false or deceptive way for commercial gain. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 14, § 2:8 (“The problem with the rationale of preventing false advertising is that
falsity of endorsement does not mark the outer boundary of the right of publicity. A
clearly false endorsement is separately actionable under state law or Lanham Act § 43(a)
as a form of false or misleading advertising. If legally provable falsity is necessary to state a
claim for invasion of the right of publicity, it would be a redundant legal theory.”).
78
See generally Michael P. Madow, Private Ownership Of Public Image: Popular Culture
And Right of Publicity, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127 (1993).
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argued that the right of publicity “redistributes wealth upwards.”79
“Why not,” he asked, “instead treat a famous person’s name and
face ‘as a common asset to be shared, an economic opportunity
available in the free market system?’”80 Second, Madow argued
that there are significant distributional consequences.81 The right
of publicity raises the price of celebrity merchandise and of advertising in general, thereby shifting wealth away from the great mass
of consumers to a very small group of persons who are already very
handsomely compensated.”82 This works to the advantage of larger
advertisers.83 Hoffman had made a similar point, labeling the phenomenon “net social disutility.”84 Third, as the title of his article
suggests, Madow argued that there is a risk of private appropriation
and censorship of popular culture.85 He made this point rather
forcefully:
It is impossible, I think, for the law to remain neutral in this contest. The law can strengthen the already potent grip of the culture industries over the
production and circulation of meaning, or it can facilitate popular participation, including participation
by subordinate and marginalized groups, in the
processes by which meaning is made and communicated.86
Fourth and finally, Madow argued that the right of publicity
creates incentives to overinvest in celebrity.87 Professor Radin
made a similar, though broader argument when she noted:
In the context of property for personhood, then, a
“thing” that someone claims to be bound up with
79

Id. at 136–37.
Id. at 137 (quoting Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 960
(6th Cir. 1980)).
81
Id. at 218–19.
82
Id. at 218.
83
Id. at 224.
84
Stephen J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
111, 120 (1980).
85
See Madow, supra note 78, at 138.
86
Id. at 141–42.
87
Id. at 216.
80
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nevertheless should not be treated as personal vis-àvis other people’s claimed rights and interests when
there is an objective moral consensus that to be
bound up with that category of “thing” is inconsistent with personhood or healthy self-constitution.88
In the context of the right of publicity, Professor Madow asked:
Is it not at least possible that society would be better
off if some of the kids who are now devoting themselves to perfecting their jumpshots (or guitar riffs)
in the usually vain hope of making it to the NBA (or
the top of the charts) said ‘to hell with it,’ and
started thinking of other ways of making a living? . . . . The high visibility of sports and entertainment careers means that it is easier (and cheaper) for people to find out about these careers . . . .
[S]ports and entertainment are fields in which narcissism, vanity, fantasy, and self-deception probably
take more than their usual toll on rational decision
making. Aspirants in these fields are especially likely
both to overestimate their talents (and their chances
of ‘making it’) and to underestimate the quality of
their competition. . . . [P]eople considering careers
in these fields do not have anything approaching
perfect information about just how long the odds on
success actually are.89
In answering each of those points, Julius Pinckaers first noted
that allowing commercial exploitation of a persona without authorization enriches the company using it (e.g. for promotional purposes), which does not necessarily ameliorate the redistribution or
concentration of wealth.90 Second, Pinckaers noted that there are
distributional consequences, but that they are outweighed by advantages. Providing an exclusive right on commercial use of a persona generates allocative efficiencies because the market will allow
88

See Radin, supra note 22, at 959–60.
Madow, supra note 78, at 216–18.
90
JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHT IN PERSONA 241 (1996).
89
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the famous person to maximize the value of the advertising at the
cost that advertisers are willing to pay. There are many celebrities
and their personae can be used in several different contexts. Demand is often elastic, and “the owner is less likely to maintain a
price that excludes potential users.”91 If this is correct, consumers
pay more because they value the image of their favorite celebrity on
a product, that is, product + desirable association = more value
than product alone.92 Third, Pinckaers noted that, while there are
potential conflicts between the right of publicity and free speech, a
balancing test can be created to deal with such conflicts.93 Finally,
Pinckaers noted that even without a right of publicity people would
enter the sports or arts fields for “other (psychological) reasons.”94
C. The Improper Use of Trademark Rationales to Justify the Right
of Publicity
Rationales that are used to justify trademark law should not be
offered to justify the right of publicity simply because the two
rights seem similar. The two rights are motivated by different primary concerns: trademark law reduces search costs for consumers
and incentivizes quality through accountability;95 the right of publicity, meanwhile, allows an individual to profit from and exercise
control over the commercial use of his name and likeness because

91

Id. at 254.
See id. at 256.
93
See id. ch. 9.3.
94
Id. at 256.
95
Most commentators also justify trademark law as protecting a trademark holder’s
property rights. See Indus. Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d
Cir. 1937) (“A trade-mark is not property in the ordinary sense but only a word or symbol
indicating the origin of a commercial product.” Hand, J.); see also Mark P. McKenna, The
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2007)
(“[T]rademark law, like all unfair competition law, sought to protect producers from
illegitimate diversions of their trade by competitors . . . . [A]merican courts protected
producers from illegitimately diverted trade by recognizing property rights.”); 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:2 (“Trademark law serves to protect both consumers from
deception and confusion over trade symbols and to protect the plaintiff’s infringed
trademark as property.”); but cf. id. § 2:1 (“The interest of the public in not being
deceived has been called the basic policy [concern of unfair competition law] . . . [b]ut
there is also the policy of encouraging competition from which the public benefits.”).
92
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of natural rights.96 “[S]ome courts have failed to see the important
distinctions and have unthinkingly imported certain inapplicable
pieces of trademark doctrine into right of publicity cases . . . . Such
courts miss the important reality that the right of publicity is only
analogous, not identical, to the law of trademarks.”97
The aspect of trademark law that is most analogous to the right
of publicity is dilution. To succeed on a dilution claim, the mark
owner must show that the mark is famous and distinctive.98 A
trademark holder could succeed under either a dilution by blurring
(if the use impairs the distinctiveness of the mark) claim or under a
dilution by tarnishment (if the use harms the reputation of the
mark) claim.99 Dilution is a cause of action for uses of a mark that
create an association between a famous mark and the defendant’s
symbol—a standard lower than likelihood of confusion.100 Thus,
dilution claims can be asserted in the absence of confusion, finding
echo in property rights, not consumer protection.
A number of scholars believe that federal protection against dilution of famous marks was a poor policy choice, because trademark law’s primary normative concern is supposedly to protect
consumers, and the vast majority of consumer harm occurs where
there is confusion.101 Dilution without confusion does not harm
consumers; it may harm a brand, however.

96

See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 5:6 (“[A]fter adding up all the differences and
similarities [between trademark and the right of publicity], the differences outweigh the
similarities. The differences stem largely from the historical fact that the right of publicity
had its origins in the law of ‘privacy,’ whereas the law of trademarks had its origins in the
tort of fraud.”).
97
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Various commentators
have noted that right of publicity claims—at least those that address the use of a person’s
name or image in an advertisement—are akin to trademark claims because in both
instances courts must balance the interests in protecting the relevant property right
against the interest in free expression.” (citing ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d
915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003))); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 5:6.
98
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 252, 264 n. 2
(4th Cir. 2007).
99
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 551 (E.D. Va. 2010).
100
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012).
101
See, e.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997).

2014]

FAME, PROPERTY, AND IDENTITY

201

For the purposes of this Article, parallels with trademark dilution do not answer the normative question about the right of publicity because that right lies outside of federal trademark law. Like
dilution, however, the right of publicity may be asserted where
there is no confusion; in fact, consumer confusion is often not a
consideration at all with the right of publicity.102 It does then resemble a property right.
Where a famous person is selling a product or service using a
likeness, name or signature as a trademark, then trademark law applies if a likelihood of source or sponsorship confusion exists. That
said, overlapping trademark and publicity analyses lead to normative confusion between the right of publicity and trademark law.
Let us explore the difference in greater detail.
Trademarks perform four basic functions:
(1) To identify one seller’s goods and distinguish
them from goods sold by others;
(2) To signify that all goods bearing the trademark
come from or are controlled by a single, albeit anonymous, source;
(3) To signify that all goods bearing the trademark
are of an equal level of quality; and
(4) As a prime instrument in advertising and selling
the goods.103
A trademark represents the goodwill an entity has accumulated.104 It allows consumers to become repeat customers and inform other consumers of their good experience;105 conversely, it
allows consumers to not repeat their business and to inform others

102

See Hart, 717 F.3d at 158 (“[T]he right of publicity does not implicate the potential
for consumer confusion.”).
103
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3:2.
104
See id. (“Without the identification function performed by trademarks, buyers would
have no way of returning to buy products that they have used and liked. If this consumer
satisfaction and preference is labeled ‘good will,’ then a trademark is the symbol by which
the world can identify that good will.”).
105
See id.
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of a bad experience. Trademarks therefore reduce transaction
costs106 and incentivize quality goods.107
Public benefits flowing from the right of publicity are not so
clear, especially when compared to trademark rationales.108 In the
words of the Restatement:
The rationales underlying recognition of a right of
publicity are generally less compelling than those
that justify rights in trademarks or trade secrets.
The commercial value of a person’s identity often
results from success in endeavors such as entertainment or sports that offer their own substantial
rewards. Any additional incentive attributable to the
right of publicity may have only marginal significance. In other cases the commercial value acquired
by a person’s identity is largely fortuitous or otherwise unrelated to any investment made by the individual, thus diminishing the weight of the property
and unjust enrichment rationales for protection. In
addition, the public interest in avoiding false suggestions of endorsement or sponsorship can be pursued
through the cause of action for deceptive marketing.109
It is also difficult to see how any consumer benefits from having
his perception of goods and services deliberately altered by the endorsement of a celebrity.110 Could one not argue that, if a celebrity
believes in a product—as endorsements are intended to show—
presumably she will not need to be compensated to use it?
106

See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental
purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and
unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular goods.”).
107
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3:2.
108
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I, 517 U.S. 484, 499, 504 (1996) (“[A] blanket
prohibition against truthful, nonmisleading speech . . . serves an end unrelated to
consumer protection.”).
109
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
110
The perception of goods and services changes when celebrities that a consumer
identifies with endorse a product. See Michael D. Basil, Identification as a Mediator of
Celebrity Effects, 40 J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 478, 478 (1996).
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While trademark law confers clear benefits on the public, the
connection between the right of publicity and public welfare is
comparatively attenuated—too much so to support the very existence of the right. Hence, if the right of publicity should exist at all,
it should exist as a natural right in an individual’s celebrity and
identity.
D. Unjust Enrichment and the Right of Publicity
Unjust enrichment is frequently advanced as the underpinning
for the right of publicity; those who use an individual’s likeness
free ride on the goodwill that individual has amassed, and are
therefore unjustly enriched. This intuition can be traced to Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,111 the case most
courts and scholars credit with creating the right of publicity.112
According to Professor Dogan:
[T]he Haelan court deliberately abandoned a harmsbased approach to celebrity right of publicity in favor of an approach centered on unjust enrichment.
In doing so, the court paved the way for a presumption of celebrities’ entitlement to every cent of
commercial value conferred by the use of their identities, without regard to whether the use caused
them any reputational or personal harm.113
We agree that overemphasis on unjust enrichment as the rationale for the right of publicity has led to its overbreadth.
While the doctrine has intuitive appeal and may inform an
equitable analysis, and may indeed be appropriate in some circumstances, an analysis of unjust enrichment illustrates that it should
not be used to justify the existence of the right of publicity. As the
Restatement asserts, “a person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution.”114 Thus, unjust enrichment is actionable only where: (1) there is an injustice;
(2) and an enrichment has occurred; (3) “at the expense of anoth111
112
113
114

202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
See Dogan, supra note 9, at 18.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011).
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er.” In the context of intellectual property law, the Restatement
rule is: “A person who obtains a benefit by misappropriation or infringement of another’s legally protected rights in any idea, expression, information, image, or designation is liable in restitution to
the holder of such rights.”115
Importantly, the Restatement recognizes unjust enrichment
where there has been an infringement of another’s “legally protected” rights. In the right of publicity, there is anything but a consensus that many infringing uses are unjust, or “at the expense of
another.” Thus, unjust enrichment in the right of publicity context
runs in to a circular reasoning problem: there is only an injustice, at
the expense of another, if the law first protects the use of a person’s name or likeness.116 Thus, we return to the real question:
what should be the boundaries of the right of publicity?
III.

THE DANGERS OF OVERPROTECTION

Over twenty years ago, Judge Alex Kozinski recognized the
dangers posed by an overly expansive right of publicity.117 In a
stinging dissent, Judge Kozinski argued that the Ninth Circuit had
extended the right of publicity too far when the court found a humorous TV ad featuring a robot dressed as a woman on a Wheel of
Fortune look-alike set to infringe Vanna White’s right of publicity.118 Judge Kozinski observed:
115

Id. § 42.
See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 815 (1935) (asserting that it is circular reasoning to base legal protection upon
economic value when economic value depends upon legal protection).
117
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
118
Id. See also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976
(10th Cir. 1996) (“One of the primary goals of intellectual property law is to maximize
creative expression. The law attempts to achieve this goal by striking a proper balance
between the right of a creator to the fruits of his labor and the right of future creators to
free expression. Underprotection of intellectual property reduces the incentive to create;
overprotection creates a monopoly over the raw material of creative expression. The
application of the Oklahoma right of publicity statute to Cardtoons’ trading cards
presents a classic case of overprotection. Little is to be gained, and much lost, by
protecting MLBPA’s right to control the use of its members’ identities in parody trading
cards.”).
116
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Something very dangerous is going on here. Private
property, including intellectual property, is essential
to our way of life. It provides an incentive for investment and innovation; it stimulates the flourishing of our culture; it protects the moral entitlements
of people to the fruits of their labors. But reducing
too much to private property can be bad medicine.
Private land, for instance, is far more useful if separated from other private land by public streets,
roads and highways. Public parks, utility rights-ofway and sewers reduce the amount of land in private
hands, but vastly enhance the value of the property
that remains.
So too it is with intellectual property. Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich
public domain. Nothing today, likely nothing since
we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like
science and technology, grows by accretion, each
new creator building on the works of those who
came before. Overprotection stifles the very creative
forces it’s supposed to nurture.119
The First Amendment provides several tools for limiting the
right of publicity arising out of the ways it has been used and applied in other, related contexts. For example, ideas and facts are
not copyrightable.120 A fair use—that is a use that is generally
transformative121—“is not an infringement of copyright.”122 Fur119

White, 989 F.2d at 1513 (Kozinksi, J., dissenting).
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (demonstrating that standard accounting
forms are not copyrightable).
121
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
122
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
the nature of the copyrighted work;
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
120
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ther, copyright law grants compulsory licenses.123 The nominative
fair use124 and descriptive fair use125 doctrines make room for the
First Amendment in trademark law.126 Similarly, the right of publicity must yield to the First Amendment, even if the subject of its
protection—a human being’s identity—is perhaps the most “personal” in all intellectual property law.
The First Amendment often erects a lower hurdle for asserting
a publicity right, because the use may amount to commercial
speech.127 This does not make the First Amendment meaningless
though, as Judge Kozinski explained: “The majority dismisses the
First Amendment issue out of hand because Samsung’s ad was
commercial speech. So what? Commercial speech may be less protected by the First Amendment than noncommercial speech, but
less protected means protected nonetheless.”128 Similarly, in the
context of advertising,129 the Supreme Court has said “we may asthe effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”).
123
17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 119(b) (2012).
124
See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992) (“[H]ere the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff’s product, rather
than its own, we hold that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use defense
provided he meets the following three requirements: First, the product or service in
question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only
so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the
product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with
the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”).
125
See WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]he use
of words for descriptive purposes is called a ‘fair use,’ and the law usually permits it even
if the words themselves also constitute a trademark.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)
(2012).
126
See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 306–08.
127
Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of Publicity with First
Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165, 195 (2010)
(“[T]he right of publicity is often applied to commercial speech. In these cases, the
exercise of publicity rights is generally consistent with the First Amendment.”).
128
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993).
129
Commercial uses of an individual’s name or likeness occur in more contexts than
just advertising and endorsements. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, (3d Cir.
2013) (“Appellant’s claims stemmed from Appellee’s alleged use of his likeness and
biographical information in its NCAA Football series of videogames.”); Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800–01 (Cal. 2001) (“Saderup sold
lithographs and T-shirts bearing a likeness of The Three Stooges reproduced from a
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sume that the advertiser’s interest is a purely economic one. That
hardly disqualifies him from protection under the First Amendment.”130
Commercial speech is speech that does “no more than propose
a commercial transaction.”131 Even in the context of commercial
speech, though, the First Amendment often erects a formidable
barrier. At a minimum, the government must show: that the commercial speech restriction is supported by a substantial state interest; that the restriction advances the substantial state interest; and
that the restriction is narrowly tailored to the substantial state interest.132 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he regulatory technique [restricting commercial speech] may extend only as far as the
interest it serves. The State cannot regulate speech that poses no
danger to the asserted state interest, nor can it completely suppress
information when narrower restrictions on expression would serve
its interest as well.”133
The Supreme Court has indicated that commercial speech restrictions that are not false or misleading are subject to scrutiny
stricter than the intermediate level of scrutiny just described.134
“[W]hen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful,
non-misleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the
preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to
depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generalcharcoal drawing he had made. These lithographs and T-shirts did not constitute an
advertisement, endorsement, or sponsorship of any product.”).
130
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
131
Id.
132
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980) (“The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the
State’s goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First,
the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.
Second, if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction
on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”).
133
Id. at 565 (internal citations omitted).
134
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (“The mere fact
that messages propose commercial transactions does not in and of itself dictate the
constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to suppress them.”).

208

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:181

ly demands.”135 Then, the exclusive realm of the right of publicity—nonprivate, nondeceptive uses of a person’s name or likeness—might be treated by a court as subject to the same “rigorous
review that the First Amendment generally demands,”136 even if
the use is commercial.
Because of an unusual procedural posture, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was recently forced to devote an entire opinion to whether the use of Michael Jordan’s name was a
commercial use in a case claiming violations of the Lanham Act and
the Illinois right of publicity.137 In Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, the
grocery store chain defendant published a full page image in a special commemorative edition of Sports Illustrated, congratulating
Michael Jordan on being inducted in to the hall of fame.138 The defendant agreed to offer the magazine for sale in its stores in the
Chicago area, in exchange for a full page of advertising space in the
magazine.139 The ad showed a pair of Jordan’s sneakers, congratulated a “fellow Chicagoan,” and indicated that Jordan was “a shoe
in” for the hall of fame.140 Of course, the Defendant’s logo was
prominently featured below the congratulatory message. The Seventh Circuit found Jewel’s speech to be commercial, and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the Supreme
Court of the United States “has not strayed from its commercialspeech jurisprudence despite calls for it to do so.”141

135

Id.; see also id. at 502–03 (“It is the State’s interest in protecting consumers from
‘commercial harms’ that provides ‘the typical reason why commercial speech can be
subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.’ Yet bans that
target truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages rarely protect consumers from such
harms. Instead, such bans often serve only to obscure an ‘underlying governmental
policy’ that could be implemented without regulating speech.”) (citations omitted).
136
Id. at 485.
137
See Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
district court agreed with Jewel that the ad was noncommercial speech and sought further
briefing on the implications of that classification. Jewel maintained that the commercialspeech ruling conclusively defeated all of Jordan’s claims. Jordan agreed, accepting
Jewel’s position that the First Amendment provided a complete defense.”).
138
Id. at 511.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 512.
141
Id. at 515–16.
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Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not
abandoned the commercial/noncommercial speech distinction in
First Amendment jurisprudence,142 that doctrine has been seriously eroded by legal scholars.143 The commercial nature of a use lost
at least some of its pull in a Supreme Court opinion in the context
of copyright and fair use in a famous case invoking 2Live Crew’s
reuse of part of Roy Orbison’s classic song “Pretty Woman.”144
142

See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2639, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (2014) (making a
finding of noncommercial speech but determining that the noncommercial speech
determination is not dispositive because the state action could not even survive
intermediate scrutiny); see also Jordan, 743 F.3d at 522.
143
DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 6.9 (2012);
See Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1317, 1317 (1988) (explaining that “virtually every commentator writing about the
first amendment believes that the [Supreme] Court’s treatment of commercial speech is
wrong”); Sean P. Costello, Comment, Strange Brew: the State of Commercial Speech
Jurisprudence Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
681, 682 (1997) (explaining that commercial speech is “in a state of constitutional
limbo”); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 628 (1990) (writing that the “commercial/noncommercial distinction makes no
sense”); David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 359, 360–61 (1990) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s treatment of
commercial speech as inconsistent and incoherent); Thomas W. Merrill, First Amendment
Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
205, 206 (1976) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s rulings in commercial speech cases
“may be difficult for lower courts to apply consistently”); Robert M. O’Neil, Nike v.
Kasky—What Might Have Been . . ., 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1259, 1259–60 (2004)
(contending that Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 gave the Court an opportunity to
clarify the “increasingly confusing” commercial speech doctrine); Robert Post, The
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (describing the
commercial speech doctrine as “a notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First
Amendment jurisprudence”); Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16
YALE J. ON REG. 85, 92 (1999) (writing that “a lack of clarity continues to mark”
commercial speech jurisprudence); Brian J. Waters, Comment, A Doctrine in Disarray:
Why the First Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for
Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1634 (1997) (criticizing the “lack of
clarity” surrounding commercial speech law); Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear: A Free
Market Approach for Economic Expression, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 21, 31 (2012) (citing
Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A
Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser”, 55 VAND. L. REV. 693, 701 (2002)
(concluding that the Court’s commercial speech doctrine is “confused and unstable”)).
144
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). Lower courts
seem to continue to engage in a commercial nature of the use inquiry. See Barton Beebe,
An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
549, 598 (2008) (“[O]f the 306 [lower court] opinions, 84.0% explicitly considered
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One of the specific statutory factors which courts examine is “the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”145 All
but rejecting the value of the statutory commercial use inquiry, Justice Souter, writing for the majority in Campbell, quoted Samuel
Johnson that “[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for
money.”146 Justice Souter’s opinion in Campbell emphasized that
the commercial nature of a use was but one factor to be balanced in
the fair use inquiry,147 correcting the court’s previous ruling in Sony Corp. that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege.”148
Several commentators take the position that the statutory fair use
factors in copyright law, including the commercial nature prong,
have been entirely displaced by a “transformative use” or “productive use” inquiry.149
One cannot ignore the fact that the commercial speech doctrine
is still the law of the land. In the context of the right of publicity,
the doctrine makes it very unlikely that a teenager tweeting “Paris
Hilton is so cool” would be liable for a right of publicity claim. This
is a good outcome. While the line between a commercial use and a
noncommercial use in the context of artistic, literary, and critical
whether the use was commercial or noncommercial in nature under factor one, while only
38.2% explicitly considered the transformativeness of the defendant’s use under the
factor.”). The years following Beebe’s study, however, have shown a significant increase
in the transformative use inquiry. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use,
15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 715, 755 (2011) (Of unreversed district court preliminary
injunctions, bench trials, and crossed motions for summary judgment during 1995-2000,
70.45% of courts considered the transformative nature of the use, compared to 95.83%
during 2005-2010).
145
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
146
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
147
See id. at 590.
148
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
149
See Netanel, supra, note 144, at 755. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works.”); Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns,
Inc., 2001 WL 1111970 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001) (“Although ‘transformativeness’ is
primarily analyzed in connection with the first fair use factor, it forms the basis of the
entire fair use analysis.”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1105, 1106–07 (1990).
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works might be blurry, it is plain that the tweet just described is
noncommercial. Heightened speech protection for that type of
plainly noncommercial speech encourages the free exchange of
ideas. The next section will discuss the convergence of courts and
scholars in working other First Amendment limitations in to the
right of publicity through the transformative use test and the
newsworthiness exemption.
THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
A properly delineated right of publicity is one that comports
with First Amendment principles, and extends only as far as the
natural rights that support its existence. The following sections
operationalize those principles.
IV.

A. The Emerging First Amendment Balancing Tests: The
Transformative Use Test and the Newsworthiness Exemption
There is no settled, structured legal framework for evaluating
right of publicity claims—including for balancing the right of publicity with the First Amendment.150 Much of the case law is irreconcilable with itself and the First Amendment.151 Moreover, there
is significant variation among the states in defining the scope of the
right of publicity.152 Indeed, the uncertainty associated with liability
150

To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken only one case focused on the right of
publicity. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578–79 (1977)
(broadcasting company infringed the “human cannonball’s” right of publicity when it
broadcast his entire act on a news program). One seemingly-settled First Amendment
exception to the right of publicity is the “newsworthiness exception,” discussed infra.
151
See Adam Liptak, When it May Not Pay to Be Famous, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/sunday-review/between-the-first-amendmentand-right-of-publicity.html?smid=tw-share (“The courts have, on the one hand, rejected
right-of-publicity suits arising from a painting of Tiger Woods, a comic book evoking the
musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter, parody baseball trading cards and a fantasy baseball
game that used the names, statistics and biographies of Major League players. But courts
have allowed suits over the broadcast of a human cannonball’s entire act, a comic book
using a hockey player’s nickname, an ad evoking Vanna White’s skill at turning letters on
‘The Wheel of Fortune’ and a reference to Rosa Parks in a song . . . . If there is a legal
principle that unites these rulings, it is hard to discern.”).
152
See infra Section IV.B.
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stemming from the right of publicity is potentially chilling
speech.153 There is, however, an emerging consensus among courts
that the use of an individual’s name or likeness should be allowed
when that use is transformative or newsworthy. We agree with this
emerging consensus.
In keeping with this rule, courts should ensure that the use is
not protected by the First Amendment’s freedom of the press
clause.154 This is a routine and established practice. Courts generally apply the “newsworthiness” test where an individual’s name or
likeness is used in relation to a matter of public interest.155
If the use is not newsworthy, courts should apply the transformative use test to balance the right of publicity with the First
Amendment. The transformative use test asks “whether a product
containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”156 Put another way, a court will ask “whether
the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an
original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation
of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question.”157
The transformative use test is widely used by courts attempting
to balance the right of publicity with the First Amendment.158
153

Electronic Arts ceased production of its popular video game NCAA Football in the
face of legal challenges to the game’s use of the likeness of college football players. Steve
Berkowitz, EA Drops Football in ‘14, Settles Cases as NCAA Fights, USA TODAY, Sept. 26,
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/09/26/ea-sports-ncaa-13video-game-keller-obannon/2878307/.
154
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”
U.S. CONST. amend. I. Matters of public interest are deemed newsworthy and subject to
First Amendment protection. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409 (Ct.
App. 1983); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 94 N.Y.2d 436, 446-47, 727
N.E.2d 549, 555 (2000); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996);
Finger v. Omni Publ’g Intern. 566 N.E.2d 141 (N.Y. 1990); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.
Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
155
See supra note 154.
156
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001).
157
Id.
158
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) (adopting the transformative
use test and citing to a long line of cases adopting the test).
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Transformative use applies even in the presence of a commercial
motivation.159 The transformative use test is elegant and relatively
simple to understand, especially when compared to the Rogers
test—another test endorsed by many courts and scholars. The Rogers test would permit a right of publicity action only if the use of an
individual’s identity was wholly unrelated to the underlying work or
was simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of
goods or services.160 The Rogers test seems to protect First
Amendment principles at the expense of the natural rights an individual possesses in her identity. In the words of the Third Circuit,
the Rogers test “is a blunt instrument, unfit for widespread application in cases that require a carefully calibrated balancing of two
fundamental protections: the right of free expression and the right
to control, manage, and profit from one’s own identity.”161
By contrast, the transformative use test takes into account important First Amendment principles. It protects speech when the
speaker contributes to the marketplace of ideas. Conversely, it allows individuals to assert natural rights in their identity when
speech does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas, but merely
free rides on an individual’s identity. That applying the transformative use test to a difficult set of facts in Hart led to a 2–1 decision
may be viewed as evidence that the transformative use test effectively balances the competing concerns of natural rights in one’s
name and likeness and the First Amendment.
Uses of an individual’s name or likeness that are wholly unrelated to a matter of public interest or creative expression cannot be
said to be transformative or newsworthy. Importantly, the high degree of deference given to defendants under the Rogers test would
allow an array of ex post justifications for an infringing use. Uses of
an individual’s name or likeness that are largely unrelated to a matter of public interest or creative expression are most likely not
159

Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (explaining that in the
context of copyright law, “the mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does
not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any more than the commercial character of
a use bars a finding of fairness”).
160
See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989).
161
See Hart, 717 F.3d at 157.
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transformative or newsworthy; they do not contribute to the marketplace of ideas. Because the wholly unrelated standard would allow such uses, the Rogers test provides insufficient protection to
right of publicity plaintiffs.
There are still lessons to take from the Rogers test. A less extreme standard applying the same principles driving the Rogers test
would appropriately balance the right of publicity and the First
Amendment. Courts allow newsworthy and transformative uses of
intellectual property because those uses contribute to the market
place of ideas; because those uses benefit society in some way. The
important part is the nexus between: (1) the use; and (2) the creative expression (transformation), or the matter of public interest
(newsworthiness). The problem with the Rogers test is that it allows
defendants to avoid liability under the right of publicity with de minimis transformation or newsworthiness.
Courts, then, should allow right of publicity claims to survive
where a plaintiff can show that the defendant’s use of an individual’s name or likeness had no real relationship to a creative expression or a matter of public interest—put another way, where there is
no transformation or newsworthiness of the person’s name or likeness. Of course, both the transformative use test and the newsworthiness exceptions are subject to judicial discretion. Balancing
competing concerns—within the proper framework—is precisely
the job of the judiciary. By giving judges properly guided discretion, allowing uses of an individual’s name or likeness that are
transformative or newsworthy achieves an ideal balance between
natural rights in individual identity and the “important countervailing social policy” of free speech.162
B. The Right of Publicity Should Be Limited After Death
The right of publicity should end with a person’s death, or soon
thereafter. That is not quite the case under current law. “The
overwhelming majority rule under either statute or common law is
that the right of publicity is descendible property and has a postmortem duration which is not conditioned on lifetime exploita162

1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14 § 2:1.

2014]

FAME, PROPERTY, AND IDENTITY

215

tion.”163 A total of twenty states have expressly adopted “a postmortem right of publicity: 14 by statute and six by common law.”164
Very few courts have simply rejected a postmortem right of publicity at common law, and when courts have, some states have reacted
by passing statutes to make the right of publicity descendible.165 In
fact, only New York and Wisconsin have flatly rejected the postmortem right of publicity, limiting the right to “living persons.”166
Yet, while at least thirty-one states167 have adopted the right of
publicity in some form, only twenty states have recognized the
right of publicity as a descendible right.168 Other states simply have
yet to consider whether the right of publicity is descendible.169
While the trend of those that have considered the issue leans heavily towards a postmortem right of publicity, there is no trend as to
163

2 id. § 9:17.
Id. § 9:18.
165
Id. (“Only one appellate court has clearly and unequivocally considered, weighed,
and rejected any postmortem right of publicity. This is the federal Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in its 1980 decision in [Memphis Development], opining as to Tennessee common
law. The law in Tennessee was subsequently changed by statute and by court decision. In
California, while one possible interpretation of the 1979 Lugosi decision was that there
was never any postmortem right of publicity under any circumstances, that implication
was later changed by the 1985 California statute. In Ohio, while a 1983 federal court
decision had held that Ohio did not recognize a postmortem duration, that was changed
by Ohio’s 1999 enactment of a postmortem right of publicity statute.”) (citations
omitted).
166
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (“A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising
purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person
without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or
her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West)
(providing civil penalties for “[t]he use, for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade,
of the name, portrait or picture of any living person.”); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Print.
& Pub., 94 N.Y.2d 436, 441, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552 (2000) (Even though section 51,
providing for civil penalties, does not explicitly apply only to living persons, New York
courts have consistently “recogniz[ed] the Legislature’s pointed objective in enacting
sections 50 and 51, [and] underscored that the statute is to be narrowly construed and
‘strictly limited to nonconsensual commercial appropriations of the name, portrait or
picture of a living person.’”) (internal citations omitted).
167
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 6:3.
168
See 2 id. § § 9:17–9:18.
169
See Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports & Exports, Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 326 (6th
Cir. 2001) (“Given the number of states that are agnostic as to the issue of a post-mortem
right of publicity it may be something of an overstatement to state that sixteen states
constitute an ‘overwhelming majority rule.’”).
164
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the duration of that right. These statutes “define varying durations
for the postmortem right, ranging from 100 years, 75 years, 70
years, 60 years, 50 years, 40 years, 30 years, 20 years, as long as
continuously used, or no stated duration.”170
There are reasonable arguments that the right of publicity seen
as a natural right should die with the individual,171 and reasonable
arguments that the right of publicity should survive the individual.172 Westfall and Landau have questioned whether referring to the
right of publicity as property (the “property syllogism”) helps shed
light on the debate and proper policy response.173 Certainly, this
Article agrees with Professor Armstrong’s assertion that
“[c]haracterization of a value as property does not solve the question of content of this right.”174
As Jennifer Rothman noted, the discomfort
with alienating publicity rights reveals an undeveloped, but very much present, concern that—even if
rooted in property—the right of publicity should
have limits placed on its alienability. In some sense
then, it is scholars who have seen things in black and
white, while the courts in the trenches have taken a
more nuanced approach, albeit an underdeveloped
and unacknowledged one.175
The differing willingness to recognize the right of publicity as
descendible, or to grant varying durations of the right, might be explained by certain jurists conceiving of the right of publicity as an
intellectual property right and certain jurists conceiving of the right
of publicity as a natural right.
The principal historical antecedent to the right of publicity,176
the right of privacy, is not descendible.177 This comports with an
170

2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 9:18 (citations omitted).
See Hoffman, supra note 84, at 133.,
172
See, e.g., Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of
Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980).
173
See Westfall & Landau, supra note 21, at 72.
174
Armstrong, supra note 6, at 465.
175
Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 205 (2012).
176
See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13.
171
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understanding of the right of privacy as a natural right: a right so
inextricably intertwined with the human to whom the right belongs, that it must cease to exist when that human ceases to exist.
The mental and physical suffering allegedly caused by an invasion
of privacy simply cannot exist after that human has died.178
Intellectual property rights, on the other hand, may continue
beyond the death of the linked individual or organization.179 This
includes trademark rights, which continue indefinitely, so long as
the mark is used in commerce.180 Trademarks continue to be protected so long as they are used in commerce because consumers
benefit from decreased transaction costs and increased quality so
long as the mark is being used in commerce. Having already rejected the use of trademark rationales in defining the scope of the
right of publicity, we submit that such rationales likewise cannot
support an argument that the right of publicity should be descendible.
As with privacy, the underlying motivation for the right of publicity—natural rights—ceases to exist when the human that owns
the right ceases to exist. It would seem absurd to argue that heirs or
assignees should be given an autonomous right to define the persona of someone else, who happens to be deceased. The choice to
lead a life of solitude or a life of publicity is also not compelling
when applied to a dead person. Heirs and assignees cannot assert
“the notion that my identity is mine—it is my property to control
177

See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 9:1 (“There is no dispute as to the postmortem
rule for traditional ‘privacy’ rights which protect human dignitary values, damage to
which is measured by mental and physical suffering and damage to reputation. Such
classic ‘privacy’ rights die with the person whose privacy was allegedly invaded. Both the
commentators and the cases unanimously support this rule.”).
178
See id.
179
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1,
1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections,
endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s
death.”); De la Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. Featherstone, 147 U.S. 209, 230
(1893) (holding that patent rights pass to patent holder’s estate).
180
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ if . . . its use
has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be
inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence
of abandonment. ‘Use’ of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”).
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as I see fit.”181 Moreover, in situations involving the disclosure of
private facts postmortem, the right of publicity could be used to
circumvent and frustrate well-established law that privacy rights
die with the individual.
There are, however, two compelling motivations for restricting
the use of an individual’s name or likeness that may still be compelling after the death of that individual: the allocative efficiency rationale and the deception-based rationales. These two rationales
only make sense as applied to famous or notable individuals. For
deception—consumer confusion—to exist, consumers must recognize the individual; this occurs only in the context of famous or
notable individuals. Similarly, the allocative efficiency rationale
applies most forcefully where resources are scarce; nonfamous individuals are not a scarce resource.182
Although not settled law, § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act183 may
be available to estates and heirs of famous and notable individuals.
Such a claim would allege that a defendant’s use caused confusion
such that members of the public believed the estate or heirs authorized a use of the deceased’s name or likeness. This would allow
for allocative efficiencies and punish deceptive uses of a deceased
and famous individual’s name or likeness.
15. U.S.C. § 1125(a) provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
181
182
183

See 1 MCCARTHY supra note 14, § 2:1.
See Baird supra, note 73, at 414.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
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goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s
goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by
such act.184
“Section 1125(a) thus creates two distinct bases of liability:
false association, § 1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising,
§ 1125(a)(1)(B).”185 The United States Supreme Court recently
directly addressed in Lexmark the issue of standing under the false
advertising prong of § 1125, holding “[t]o invoke the Lanham Act’s
cause of action for false advertising, a plaintiff must plead (and ultimately prove) an injury to a commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused by the defendant’s misrepresentations.”186 In reaching that conclusion, the court engaged in a
two-step inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff fell within the zone of
interest of § 1125; and (2) whether plaintiff’s injury was proximately caused by a violation of § 1125?187
While this Article cannot identify a case on point since Lexmark, there are several examples of instances where lower courts
have allowed a Lanham Act false association claim to be asserted by
an estate.188 One district court in California concluded that “[b]y
184

Id.
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (2014).
186
Id. at 1395.
187
See id. at 1388.
188
See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[B]ecause
Facenda’s voice is a distinctive mark, the Estate owns the mark, and [defendant’s use of
that mark] allegedly creates a likelihood of confusion that Facenda’s Estate [endorsed the
product.]); Cheever v. Acad. Chi., Ltd., 690 F. Supp. 281, 288, 88 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(noting no apparent impediment to author John Cheever’s survivors’ § 43(a) claims and
commenting that potential financial motive would not undermine claim based on literary
reputation of deceased); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1375–76 (D.N.J.
1981) (concluding facts supporting finding of likelihood of confusion also supported
§ 43(a) claims brought by Elvis Presley’s estate); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.
Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (assuming without comment that estate and assignees of
185
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using the term ‘another person’ [in § 1125(a)], Congress selected
language broad enough to encompass a claim by a deceased celebrity’s Estate or by any celebrity’s assignee.”189 Whether or not the
estates and heirs of celebrities have standing under § 1125 is an issue the higher courts may address in the future. For now, it seems
quite feasible for such an estate to assert a § 1125 false association
claim. This might obviate the need for a descendible right of publicity, as § 1125 could ensure the efficient allocation of resources and
prevent consumer deception.
This Article does not endorse the notion that an estate should
be able, as a matter of policy, to assert a § 1125 false association
claim in perpetuity. That may be a result of the application of
§ 1125 standing for estates of deceased, famous individuals.190 If
courts do not ultimately find such standing under § 1125, the Authors do not take the view that a postmortem right of publicity is
necessarily suboptimal policy, but in such a case the right should be
limited in duration to no more than ten years. This would provide a
reasonable “cool down” period for estates to prevent the onslaught
of uses that would otherwise inevitably ensue with the recent death
of a famous individual.191

Agatha Christie could bring a § 43(a) false endorsement claim, but dismissing it because
there was no likelihood of confusion).
189
Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
190
Nor does this Article endorse the notion that § 1125 should displace the right of
publicity. See Barbara A. Solomon, Can the Lanham Act Protect Tiger Woods? An Analysis of
Whether the Lanham Act is a Proper Substitute for a Federal Right of Publicity, 94
TRADEMARK REP. 1202, 1228 (2004) (“To those who resist a federal right of publicity law
because they believe that the Lanham Act provides sufficient coverage, the case law does
not bear this out. The Lanham Act does not protect against misappropriation of one’s
likeness, nor should it, given the different interests protected by the Lanham Act and by
state right of publicity laws. To those who believe that a federal right of publicity statute
would improperly intrude on First Amendment interests, this too is not borne out by the
existing law, which recognizes a strong and rigorous First Amendment defense to right of
publicity claims. If there is a consensus that one’s persona should be protected from
unauthorized commercial use (and the fact that a majority of states have enacted a statute
suggests there is), a federal statute to protect the right of publicity may be the only way to
accomplish that goal. Clearly, the Lanham Act in its current incarnation is not a proper
substitute.”).
191
Rothman, supra note 175, at 240 (“[T]he durational limit for a postmortem right of
publicity that might be the most appropriate is one that grants heirs only a limited
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The exact scope of the postmortem right of publicity is not as
important as the principle that the postmortem right should be limited in duration and reach.192 Whether § 1125, a reasonable cool
down period, or a non-descendible right provides that limitation is
a matter we will leave for courts and legislatures.
C. The Right of Publicity Should be Limited to Enumerated
Natural Characteristics
The scope of the right of publicity recognized by some courts
today confuses protecting an individual’s natural rights with protecting consumers from deception. The generally accepted test
used to establish an infringement of the right of publicity is whether or not the plaintiff is “identifiable.”193 We support this test, but
the ill-defined scope of identity allows plaintiffs to assert the right
of publicity when a use does not make use of the plaintiff’s identity
in a way that affects her natural rights.194 The right of publicity
should only be actionable where a Plaintiff’s name or visual likeness—the extent of the individual’s natural rights—are identifiable.195

postdeath period of rights in which the dignity interests of the survivors are most at issue
and the impact on pre-death incentives is likely to be greatest.”).
192
See id. at 241 (“In the context of postmortem rights, the countervailing public
interest in using a deceased person’s image will weigh more strongly against the interests
of the heirs or devisees. Accordingly, countervailing speech and liberty interests will more
often limit enforcement of publicity rights than in the context of inter vivos rights.”).
193
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 3:18 (“Right of publicity case law routinely states that
plaintiff must plead and prove that defendant’s use ‘identifies’ plaintiff.”).
194
See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1988) (Advertiser hired singer to mimic
Midler’s voice once Midler refused to participate in advertisement.); Carson v. Here’s
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983).
195
Several lawsuits, some successful and some failures, demonstrate the absurdity that
ensues when plaintiffs are allowed to assert the right of publicity based on the
identifiability of something other than the plaintiff’s name or visual likeness. See Oliveira
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2001) (singer claims violation of right of
publicity when defendant uses musical composition that singer made famous); White v.
Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992); Carson, 698 F.2d at 839;
Robinson v. HSBC Bank USA, 732 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (plaintiff
claimed violation of right of publicity when Defendant publishes picture of plaintiff’s
house, because Plaintiff and his house are so closely associated); Leopold v. Levin, 259
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As noted above, the scope of the right of publicity that we are
advocating for recognizes that the right of publicity does have what
may seem a dual purpose. Normatively, it is rooted in the right to
protect (up to a point) one’s identity; the right of publicity exists
because there are instances where the right of privacy and deception-based restrictions do not adequately protect rights in a person’s identity. For example, in the case of the unauthorized use of
an accurate picture of a previously non-famous individual in advertisement, the right of publicity functions as an extension of privacy.196 In other similar cases, the right allows a celebrity to manage
commercial exploitation of her fame such as: the unauthorized Tshirts depicting celebrities in a life-like manner;197 the unlicensed
television broadcast of a performer’s entire act;198 and a use such as
“Famous baseball pitcher Sam Spade may be the best in the league,
but he has never tasted HIGH FIVE sports drink. Why don’t
you?”199
Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores200 provides an excellent example of
a situation where deception and privacy based restrictions would
not provide a viable cause of action: it is very unlikely for consumers to be confused in to thinking that Michael Jordan sponsored or
endorsed Jewel Food Stores based upon Jewel Food Stores’ advertisement congratulating Michael Jordan for being inducted into the
hall of fame.201 Nor is Jordan’s induction in to the hall of fame private information.
In such instances, the right of publicity serves to protect an individual’s rights in their identity. Put differently, it allows individuals to exercise their autonomous right of self-definition. It allows
N.E.2d 250 (1970) (convicted murderer’s right of publicity claim failed against book and
movie authors based on the convicted murder’s story).
196
See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
197
See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 800–01.
198
See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
199
5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 28:14.
200
743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014).
201
See id. at 522 (“We note that the lone federal claim in the suit—a false-endorsement
claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)—requires proof that Jewel’s
congratulatory ad caused a likelihood of confusion that Jordan was a Jewel–Osco sponsor
or endorsed its products and services.”).
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for a life of solitude or a life of publicity. As noted earlier, it is difficult to imagine how asserting the right of publicity in any of the
contexts just given benefits the public because the public is not protected—from being confused as to sponsorship or otherwise. The
normative underpinning that this Article suggests is narrow but
different: the right of publicity is based in a property-like right in
one’s name and likeness. That is the state’s substantial interest.
One should be allowed to assert that natural right so long as it
yields to “important countervailing social polic[ies] which negate[]
this natural impulse of justice”202—here, the First Amendment.
We have chosen an individual’s name (including using signature as a name) and likeness as the extent of the natural rights in
her identity partly because those are the two most important, immutable characteristics of identity. One could reasonably argue that
voice is another one of those important, immutable characteristics
that should be included in an individual’s natural rights.203 We do
not think including voice in the concept of identity for the right of
publicity would necessarily be bad policy. Individuals often work
202

1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 2:1.
See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Kennedy, J. dissenting) (“I do not believe that the common law right of publicity may be
extended beyond an individual’s name, likeness, achievements, identifying characteristics
or actual performances, to include phrases or other things which are merely associated
with the individual, as is the phrase “Here’s Johnny.” The majority’s extension of the
right of publicity to include phrases or other things which are merely associated with the
individual permits a popular entertainer or public figure, by associating himself or herself
with a common phrase, to remove those words from the public domain.”); White v.
Samsung Elecs., Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The term ‘likeness’
refers to a visual image not a vocal imitation.” (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1988))); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir.
1993) (“Once the right of publicity is extended beyond specific physical characteristics,
this will become a recurring problem: Outside name, likeness and voice, the things that
most reliably remind the public of celebrities are the actions or roles they’re famous for. A
commercial with an astronaut setting foot on the moon would evoke the image of Neil
Armstrong. Any masked man on horseback would remind people (over a certain age) of
Clayton Moore. And any number of songs—“My Way,” “Yellow Submarine,” “Like a
Virgin,” “Beat It,” “Michael, Row the Boat Ashore,” to name only a few—instantly
evoke an image of the person or group who made them famous, regardless of who is
singing.”); Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The right of
publicity, as defined by the state courts, is limited to using a celebrity’s name, voice, face
or signature.”) (citations omitted).
203
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hard at crafting their voice to sound a certain way, and like the
trademark holder who works hard to establish a brand, a Lanham
act claim will protect most, if not all, “voice appropriation”
claims.204 This then changes the test: The distinct sound of an individual’s voice, the unique fashion sense of an individual, or the
bubbly personality of an individual are all choices that individual’s
make, and other individuals should be free to make similar choices,
unless there is consumer confusion.
In the United States, these choices are generally outside the
scope of natural rights. Intellectual property protections in the
United States are motivated by utilitarian concerns, not natural or
moral rights, and the boundaries of the rights dictate the incentives
the United States offers. In the context of copyright and patent law,
this utilitarian motivation is present in the Constitution: [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”205 Similarly, trademark law
is primarily motivated by decreasing transaction costs and ensuring
accountability, hence its normative roots in consumer protection.206
As a general matter, the United States rejects the notion that
inventors, authors, and brand owners should be granted protection
of their respective discoveries, writings, and business reputations
or symbols because their work product is part of their personhood.
The right of publicity, on the other hand, exists precisely to reify
and commoditize the concept of personhood. The right of publicity
is not a simple alternative to fill doctrinal gaps left by the Lanham
Act and similar laws, where neither the utilitarian concern of preventing consumer confusion, nor natural rights in an individual’s
identity are present.207 Instead, the right of publicity should be de204

Carson, 698 F.2d at 839 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (“The existence of a cause of
action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (1976) and Michigan
common law does much to undercut the need for policing against unfair competition
through an additional legal remedy such as the right of publicity.”).
205
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
206
Supra, Section II.C.
207
Policy decisions have already been made by the Lanham Act and other related laws
and those decisions should govern the limits of the use of name or likeness where natural
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lineated to effect its true purpose: to protect rights in an individual’s identity, whether unwanted fame or management of the commercial exploitation of a person’s fame in cases where no consumer
deception is present. We believe those rights, which one could call
“natural,” should extend to name and visual likeness, though perhaps a case can be made that they should extend to a limited number of other enumerated natural characteristics, such as voice.
Finally, we suggest that a federal legislative solution208 could be
most appropriate to: (a) create a level playing field for the right of
publicity which varies in scope and duration among the various
states; (b) distinguish its purpose from trademark law; and (c) set
proper limits in particular as to which characteristics can be protected, all against the backdrop of First Amendment considerations.
CONCLUSION
Conceiving the right of publicity as a derivative of or related to
trademark law has led to serious errors by courts and commentators. It may even be a misnomer to label the right of publicity as a
species of intellectual property. Any argument that the right of
publicity somehow incentivizes individuals to pursue laudable careers is as disingenuous as the argument that the public benefits
from a celebrity’s ability to sue for monetary damages when a person or entity makes a non-private, non-deceptive use of an individual’s likeness. The right of publicity should be delineated to effectuate its limited but legitimate purpose: to protect an individual’s
natural rights in her identity.
rights are not affected. We recognize, however that the Lanham Act only sets a floor of
liability, and states may offer heightened protection. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2,
§ 22:2 (“The federal Lanham Act does not occupy the field of trademark and unfair
competition law in such a way that it would preempt parallel state law.”).
208
Many have called for a federal right of publicity in the past. See Eric J. Goodman, A
National Identity Crisis: The Need for A Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J.
ART & ENT. L. 227 (1999); Sean D. Whaley, “I’m A Highway Star”: An Outline for A
Federal Right of Publicity, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 257, 258 (2009); Kevin L. Vick
& Jean-Paul Jassy, Why A Federal Right of Publicity Statute Is Necessary, 28 COMM. LAW. 14
(2011).

